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ABSTRACT 
RESPONSIVENESS, REPRESENTATION, AND DEMOCRACY: A CRITICAL 
CONCEPTUL ANALYSIS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL SCIENCE 
FEBRUARY 2021 
JOSHUA BECK, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Frederic C. Schaffer 
Over forty years ago, Hanna Pitkin expressed concern that social scientists were failing to give 
concepts the attention which they needed (Pitkin 1972, 277). This thesis takes up the same 
theme, asking how the concept of responsiveness is treated by political scientists. The 
goal to reveal confusion that surrounds widely used concepts such as responsiveness. 
The analysis offered in this thesis has significance for the discipline of political science in 
three ways. First, it highlights confusion surrounding the concept of responsiveness 
itself. Responsiveness is a widely utilized concept employed throughout the social 
sciences; however, as this thesis shows, there is wide disagreement in how the concept 
is understood. This confusion is fueled by the frequent failure of scholars to critically 
analyze the concept and the assumptions which have been attached to the 
understanding of responsiveness. Second, by analyzing the related concepts of 
representation and democracy, this thesis suggests that there is a lack of attention to 
concepts which are employed for research that extends beyond responsiveness. Many 
other concepts that are foundational to our discipline warrant increased scrutiny. Third 
and finally, the thesis highlights the danger of ignoring the ideological commitments of 
political scientists, commitments that can shape in hidden but consequential ways how 
we study the world around us. 
v 
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1 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
The discipline of political science functions on a set of conceptual building blocks. 
Concepts are used to lay the groundwork for our research and build theories. Indeed, a 
concept like “democracy” is only able to function as a tool of inquiry or area of study 
because many concepts form the framework through which democracy is understood. 
This thesis critically examines one of these supporting concepts, “responsiveness.” In 
studying responsiveness, this thesis also examines “representation,” a closely related 
concept. Together, these two concepts function as cornerstones of democracy in the 
eyes of many scholars and their presence in the world signals to many the presence of 
democracy. Whether such is, indeed, the case is the question that motivates this thesis. 
How synonymous are responsiveness and representation? Does responsiveness always 
signal the presence of democracy? For that matter why should representation signal 
democracy? To answer these questions, this thesis places its primary focus on 
responsiveness. Responsiveness is deeply, perhaps inseparably, connected to 
democracy. A responsive government, we have come to believe, must be some form of 
democratic government and a sign of good governance. While an unresponsive 
government is often considered to be a hallmark of bad governance. If responsiveness is 
inseparable from democracy and responsiveness is needed for good governance, then 
non-democracies simply cannot have good governance. The strength of such 




This assumption hints at the need to evaluate how the concept of responsiveness is 
being used within the discipline. This thesis takes up this task. Its first goal is to examine 
the concept of responsiveness as it used within the discipline. Through an examination 
of four exemplary articles, the study will seek to shed light on how responsiveness is 
conceived within the discipline and what is being missed about the nature of 
responsiveness. The second is to show the larger implications of critically examining 
responsiveness for the study of democracy. The third and final goal is to examine the 
broader implications for the discipline of political science, implications that point to a 
need for a significant reevaluation of how concepts are used and understood. 
The design of this thesis was strongly influenced by Frederic Schaffer’s book, Elucidating 
Social Science Concepts: An Interpretivist Guide (2015). The focus of Schaffer’s work is 
on providing tools through which concepts can be studied and understood from an 
interpretivist perspective (Schaffer 2015, 1). There are three tools which he provides for 
this purpose (ibid., 22). First, we see “grounding” which is examining how scholars are 
understanding the concepts they employ. This practice can be seen in chapters 2 and 4 
of this thesis. Second is the process of “locating” which examines the historic and 
linguistic background of a concept. I undertake this task in chapter 3. Third and finally, 
there is the practice of “exposing” which is, “[Bringing] to light how everyday and social 
science concepts are embedded in webs of power” (ibid.). Exposing is seen by enlarge in 
chapter 5 and is of particular importance to this thesis. It is the process of exposing that 
allows this work to be a critical conceptual analysis. This process is of crucial importance 




as this thesis moves forward it will engage with and question the networks of power in 
which the concepts we examine function. This thesis pursues its goals over the course of 
six chapters. Chapter One, this chapter outlines the goals of the study. Chapter Two 
delves into exemplary articles that directly engage with the concept of responsiveness. 
It reveals a deep and somewhat confusing connection between responsiveness and 
representation. Chapter Three seeks to understand the connection between 
responsiveness and representation by looking at each concept’s usage in ordinary 
language. It does this through a close examination of the Oxford English Dictionary and 
examples of usage from written works including, academic work, novels, poetry, and 
magazine articles. Ultimately, it shows that the meaning of the two differ significantly 
and that their use as synonymous by key political scientists raises questions about what 
they are failing to notice in their studies as a result. Chapter Four attempts to distinguish 
the concepts from each other by examining responsiveness in the context of 
authoritarianism, a context in which representation should not be present. That 
investigation suggests that the nature of responsiveness has been misunderstood within 
the discipline. Chapter Five surfaces the unconscious yet deeply present teleologic 
assumptions that undergird the use of responsiveness in the discipline. Chapter Six, the 
conclusion, summarizes the key arguments of the thesis and suggests several ways to 





Chapter 2 – Do Political Scientists Treat Responsiveness as a 
Distinct Concept? 
 
Political scientists tend to treat as twins concepts which are closely related and consider 
questions about differences between them to be unimportant (Pitkin 1972, 277). Pitkin 
writes: 
Social Scientists are as liable as philosophers to think in terms of broad 
dichotomies and avoid the seemingly trivial chore of fine distinctions. That is all 
very well where our object of study can be clearly identified apart from the 
words in which we speak of it (“study that thing, there, whatever it is”); but if 
identification depends on concepts, then confusion about terms will result, as 
Ardent has said, “in a kind of blindness with respect to the realities.” If you use 
distinct terms interchangeably or ignore fine differences, then as Cavell puts it, 
there is likely to be “something you aren’t noticing about the world.” (ibid.)  
What are the concepts which political science literature treats as twins of 
“responsiveness” in the context of government? To answer this question, the chapter 
will look at two articles which exemplify how scholars within the discipline think about 
responsiveness. I focus on these articles for two reasons. First, they are two of the most 
widely cited works on responsiveness. The first has been cited 379 times and the second 




this should not be a surprise since it is a highly specific conceptual inquiry), they are 
articles which other scholars have deemed to have enough weight to either support 
their own work or to be worthy of combatting. Second, they exemplify the discipline by 
representing the two dominant schools of thought on governmental responsiveness.  
In the first article, “Government Responsiveness and Political Contestation in 
Comparative Perspective,” Hobolt and Klemmensen view responsiveness as a result of 
competitive elections (2008, 309). While they do suggest that there are different 
possible explanations for why elections produce responsiveness, ultimately there is no 
question on their part whether responsiveness is actually stemming from elections 
(ibid., 310). Their study goes on to examine the conditions in which elections would 
produce more or less responsive governments. They pose five hypotheses ranging from 
how the form of the party system affects responsiveness to how uncertainty impacts 
responsiveness (ibid., 313-316). They then offer an empirical analysis of Denmark, 
Britain, and the United States. A focus on these cases allows them to test each of their 
hypotheses both internationally and intra-nationally over time. In their results section 
Hobolt and Klemmensen determine that their hypotheses and general theoretic 
expectations were met with some slight deviance (ibid., 323-331). The study is an 
excellent example of understanding responsiveness as a product of elections. Scholars 
who take this perspective are interested in understanding how elections produce and 
impact responsiveness. Most relevant to this thesis is the way that Hobolt and 




In the beginning of the article, Hobolt and Klemmensen start by seemingly separating 
the two concepts, “in this ‘delegate’ view of representation, elected representatives are 
expected to act responsively to the needs of their constituents” (Hobolt and 
Klemmensen 2008, 309). At first glance, it seems that they have explained, if minimally, 
the difference between representation and responsiveness. As we read, it becomes 
apparent that this distinction collapses, for instance when they suggest that they are 
contributing to the “literature on policy responsiveness” (ibid. 311), or when they state 
that this work “corroborates previous studies of representation” (ibid. 332). We are thus 
left with the question: does this study contribute to the literature on responsiveness or 
representation? Although the title as well as earlier sections would suggest that it is a 
work focused on responsiveness; by the conclusion, we see that they seem to be self-
categorizing it as a work examining representation. This confusion begins to clear itself 
up when we look at some examples of the use of representation and responsiveness 
within the article itself. In the theoretic grounding of the article, Hobolt and 
Klemmensen consistently switch between the use of representation and responsiveness 
(ibid. 311 and 313). In one instance, the scholars explain that because there are few 
studies on responsiveness outside of the United States, there is little understanding of 
how “political contestation influences the degree of representation” (Ibid. 311). In a 
second instance, they argue that a plurality system of elections produces 
representatives who provide higher levels of “representation than a proportional 
system” which can be understood as a result of there being a higher level of “incentive 




plurality systems (ibid. 313). In each of these examples, we see that the concepts of 
representation and responsiveness are used interchangeably. This usage begs the 
question, why would they choose to use both terms, if contextually they seem to be 
appealing to the same meaning? 
To answer the question, let us look back at their definition. Here is where we see Hobolt 
and Klemmensen separating the two concepts, “in this ‘delegate’ view of 
representation, elected representatives are expected to act responsively to the needs of 
their constituents” (Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008, 309). Given the use of the concepts, 
it is clear that they have not, however, been successfully separated. On a closer look, it 
becomes apparent why this is. While it is true that they have explained what 
representatives are doing, they have actually defined representation as “acting 
responsively” and by doing this, have setup a conceptual quagmire making it almost 
impossible to separate the two concepts. This conflation leads to confusion. 
Conceptually, representation and responsiveness should be distinct, but in the context 
of government, this distinction has been lost for these two scholars. As a result, it is 
unclear what they are actually studying. Perhaps, as the title and content suggest (ibid. 
311), they are studying on responsiveness; however, since being responsive is what 
representatives do (ibid. 309), it is almost impossible to say whether in their use of the 
term, they actually mean that they are studying representation. This confusion is 
compounded when they claim to be contributing to the literature on representation in 
the conclusion (ibid. 332). While they may have planned and executed a powerful and 




determine what this is a study of. It could as easily be a study of what causes higher 
levels of representation, as what creates government responsiveness. 
 Hobolt and Klemmensen are by no means the first authors to struggle with closely 
related concepts. Kuklinski and Stanga, in “Political Participation and Government 
Responsiveness: The Behavior of California Superior Courts,” (1979), make a similar 
although much less noticeable blunder. They are primarily interested with the ways that 
responsiveness is produced through non-electoral participation (Kuklinski and Stanga 
1979, 1090). While they acknowledge that “It is natural that scholars should focus their 
attention on the most common form of participation” (ibid.), they are concerned with a 
lack of attention to other forms of participation. In this work, Kuklinski and Stanga 
examine responsiveness to public opinion from the California Superior Court System. 
Specifically, this study looks at responsiveness to public opinion in relation to 
prosecution for possession of Marijuana (ibid., 1091). The California Superior Court 
system makes an ideal subject for study. Even though some are elected, most of the 
judges are appointed by the governor and generally the judges and district attorneys 
who are elected are not engaged in a competitive election (ibid., 1096). As a result, 
electoral accountability does not seem to act as a strong explanatory variable for why 
the courts shift toward public opinion. In 1972 there was an initiative ballot proposition, 
brought forward by California voters, which would have legalized the possession and 
consumption of Marijuana for recreational use (ibid.). Ultimately, it was rejected by a 
majority of citizens during the general election but not without contestation. Although 




clear form of participation. Kuklinski and Stanga examine the impact of this proposition 
on the judicial rulings in cases dealing with marijuana possession by examining the 
sentencing in all of the marijuana conviction cases from 1971 through 1973 to test for 
changes in sentencing severity (ibid. 1092). They find that public opinion seemed to 
have little impact on sentencing in the first two years, there was a noticeable shift 
toward more lenient sentencing in Marijuana related cases during the third (ibid. 1093). 
In contrast to the lack of extensive communication of public opinion during these first 
two years, in the third year, which immediately followed the ballot proposition, the 
judicial officials would be aware that there was extensive public support for more 
relaxed sentencing on marijuana offenses. While the outcome is intuitive, this study can 
only carry limited weight as the actual period of time being studied is rather short and it 
is limited to only one state. Admitting to this shortcoming, Kuklinski and Stanga suggest 
that this study will encourage deeper work into the connection between responsiveness 
and non-electoral participation (ibid., 1099). 
Kuklinski and Stanga’s treatment of responsiveness in their article is most interesting. In 
the article itself, they stress the importance of communication between citizens and 
officials to responsiveness (Kuklinski and Stanga 1979, 1090-1091, 1097). 
Communication is so important to them that they put forward its linkage to 
responsiveness as the core of responsive governance. On the basis of this view, they 
propose two major implications for their work: 
The first is that electoral accountability may not be, as sometimes is supposed, 




related to the first, is the one we wish to stress: the communication to 
government actors of policy preference held by citizens may well be a central 
component if not the core of a responsive system of government. (ibid., 1097) 
As should be expected in a study of responsiveness, Kuklinski and Stanga find a 
connection between responsiveness and governance. They seem to consider 
responsiveness to be distinct from representation, at least superficially. Their confusion 
only becomes apparent by looking carefully at the work’s theoretical base. When 
defining responsiveness, they describe their understanding of it as, “[according] with 
Pitkin’s explication of responsiveness as an emergent property of a complex system of 
interactions among citizens and government officials” (ibid., 1091). However nebulous 
of a description, what is of most interest here are their citations. They cite Hanna 
Pitkin’s 1967 work The Concept of Representation as well as Prewitt and Eulau’s 1969 
work “Political Matrix and Political Representation: Prolegomenon to a New Departure 
from an Old Problem.” Although each work discusses representation, neither title 
suggests that the work is dealing with responsiveness per say. Even more troubling, 
while almost all citations in their work are linked to specific pages, in this instance, there 
are no page references included in the citations. The implication of this absence seemed 
to be that they were taking the works as entireties for the theoretic grounding. In order 
to confirm this suspicion, I read both works and found only a limited discussion of 
responsiveness. Beginning however with Prewitt and Eulau, it becomes clear that the 
actual way that Kuklinski and Stanga are thinking of responsiveness is in terms of 




action (Prewitt and Eulau 1969, 428). Representation, in contrast, is based on the, 
“overall structure and function of the system” (ibid.). There is a clear misalignment 
between how Prewitt and Eulau are using the two concepts and how Kuklinski and 
Stanga are. This misalignment becomes even more clear as they cite Pitkin’s work.  
Pitkin writes: 
What makes it representation is not any single action by any one participant, but 
the over-all structure and function of the system, the patterns emerging from 
multiple activities of many people. It is representation if the people (or a 
constituency) are present in government even though they do not literally act for 
themselves. (Pitkin 1967, 221-222) 
In this quote, it is not responsiveness that is generated by a “complex system of 
interactions” but instead representation. This view is in accord with Prewitt and Eulau’s 
understanding of representation. What we see developing is a conflation of the 
concepts by Kuklinski and Stanga. If they are drawing on Pitkin’s work, the way that 
Kuklinski and Stanga are thinking of the interaction between the California Superior 
Courts and the citizens they represent is in terms of representation rather than 
responsiveness. Pitkin’s understanding of representation is very much fixed on the 
systemic level rather than the individual action. This understanding can be seen clearly 
when Pitkin states: 
The representative system must look after the public interest and be responsive 




of the public interest. At both ends the process is public and institutional. The 
individual legislature does not act alone, but as a member of a representative 
body. (ibid., 224) 
While Kuklinski and Stanga look at the court systems decision making (Kuklinski and 
Stanga 1979, 1091-1092), they describe responsiveness at the systemic level which 
Pitkin would likely call representation. It would be fair for them to claim that, in accord 
with Pitkin, they are examining representation. Just as representation can and does 
happen at the systemic level, so does responsiveness. In the same way if they were 
studying specific incidents of responsiveness it would not be unlikely to see them 
instead view it as representation. The concepts are for them interchangeable. 
I do not claim that Pitkin’s understanding of representation and responsiveness is the 
clearest view. What I am pointing out is that based on their claim to hold to Pitkin’s 
understanding, Kuklinski and Stanga have taken the two concepts and combined them 
into one. Responsiveness may happen at the systemic level but according to Pitkin this is 
not the case. With this problem in mind, what is seen is that Kuklinski and Stanga’s 
article suffers from nearly the same issue as Hobolt and Klemmensen’s article. Because 
they do not seem to have a clear grasp of the difference between the concept of 
responsiveness and the concept of representation, Kuklinski and Stanga would have a 
hard time arguing that they are studying responsiveness after making the claim that 
they are theoretically grounded in Pitkin’s work. Where should we situate their work 
within the literature? Should we consider it to be a study of responsiveness or should 




clarity, engaging their work in a serious examination of either concept would be ill-
advised. While the content has value and could contribute to one of the conceptual 
inquiries, right now it likely should not be used in the study of either. 
This connection between responsiveness and representation is problematic in these 
instances because they represent some of the key works on responsiveness within the 
literature. This seemingly common conflation raises the question: what is it about these 
two concepts that causes them to be confused for one another? If responsiveness is 
conflated with representation, what is it that we are missing about these concepts? It 
seems that there are grounds to view this confusion as being more widespread as we 
see a confusion of the two concepts in other works (Mair 2008; Cleary 2007; etc.). There 
are, of course, authors that do not make this connection and instead confuse 
responsiveness with another concept; however, this thesis will not seek out every 





Chapter 3 – How are Responsiveness and Representation 
Distinguished in Ordinary Language? 
 
In the previous chapter, I identified representation as a concept which is regularly 
confused with responsiveness. The confusion is not an explicit mix up of concepts but 
rather stems from a deeper and perhaps subconscious conjoining of the concepts. This 
conjoining can be seen in each study examined in the previous chapter, the authors 
attempted to distinguish between the two concepts but without success. This confusion 
leaves the question, what is it about responsiveness and representation that makes 
them hard to separate from each other? This chapter takes the first steps to answering 
this question by examining how each concept is used in ordinary language. I will look at 
each concept’s respective definitions and ordinary use. By doing this examination I will 
lay the groundwork for discovering what about the world is being missed when authors 
are conjoining these concepts. 
In the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) responsiveness is defined as, “The state or quality 
of being responsive” (OED 2010, responsiveness). While the definition simply redirects 
our attention elsewhere, by examining the example sentences we can learn something 
about the context and usage of our concept before looking to the root definition. The 
OED gives an example from a 2005 article in Computer Buyer where the author writes, 
“The machine felt snappy to use, with no real lack of responsiveness in any of the usual 
day-to-day tasks”(ibid.). Here responsiveness is used in a complimentary fashion to 




responsiveness is not communicating a new idea but instead reinforcing the existing 
statement that the computer is snappy. In contrast to non-responsiveness which would 
suggest a computer that is not ideal even for day-to-day tasks, responsiveness seems to 
be a positive attribute of the computer. A second exemplary sentence states, “If the 
slightest attention had been paid to propriety by Mr. Gibbon, to unity of design, and to 
responsiveness of execution” (ibid.). Interestingly, what we see is that responsiveness is 
again used in terms that suggest a quick reaction to something. Although it is 
challenging to say with absolute certainty that the issue was not the rapidity of Mr. 
Gibbon’s response but instead failing to respond appropriately; we can say with 
certainty that ‘’responsiveness of execution” is a positive characteristic and in turn its 
absence is negative. Between these two examples, it can be shown with fair certainty 
that responsiveness has a positive connotation. Additionally, when combined with the 
previous example, it does seem clear that responsiveness involves quick reaction to 
stimuli. 
In order to provide a more grounded understanding of what makes responsiveness 
unique, I move on from an examination of responsiveness to the more foundational 
word “responsive.” “Responsive” has several definitions provided in the OED most of 
which I will not delve into. I will not look at every definition provided, because it would 
be repetitive rather than helpful to examine them all and because I lack the technical 
knowledge to elucidate the usage of several. The first provided definition reads, “Of a 
letter: answering, responding; written in reply“ (OED 2010, Responsive). This definition 




making reply. Also with to, against” (ibid.). These definitions provide the most basic 
level of explanation for the concept. Being responsive involves responding or replying to 
something. We see that it could specifically be written letters; however, one of the 
samples of use provides a deeper insight, “There the grey heath lit the responsive fire” 
(ibid.). This example is particularly useful as it shows that things outside of written or 
spoken language can have the function of being responsive. With this knowledge it is 
easy to conclude that responsiveness can be any action or event that is a result of 
another. For example, a boy might run loudly through the woods behind his home as a 
responsive deer runs away from the noise.  
At this point, we can see several clear characteristics of responsiveness. First, 
responsiveness suggests quick action. It is not just responding but doing so in a timely 
fashion. Second, responsiveness entails responding to something. Without some stimuli 
prompting a response, it is not possible to respond. Even in the example of someone 
scaring themselves, they are reacting to an internal stimuli telling them that something 
is off about their situation. Third, responsiveness can be a lingual response to non-
lingual stimuli, a non-lingual response to lingual stimuli, or a non-lingual response to 
non-lingual stimuli. Fourth, responsiveness can come from either sentient or non-
sentient actors. We see this distinction made between the example of Mr. Gibbon’s lack 
of responsiveness and that of the fire’s responsiveness. Fifth, responsiveness can come 
from either an individual or a group. This characteristic can be exemplified by looking at 
a church congregation. Many churches will have a time of responsive prayer or 




congregation will reply with the next line. In this example we see both a group act 
responsively toward an individual’s stimulus and the individual react responsively to a 
group. Sixth and finally, responsiveness can stem either from external stimuli as seen 
above or from internal stimuli. Internal stimuli can be harder to identify but are certainly 
still present. The human body provides a plethora of examples for this usage of the 
responsiveness. We see one such example in the article, “Cognitive Activity in Sleep and 
Responsiveness to External Stimuli.” Burton, Harsh, and Badia write, “With appropriate 
instructions and/or training, sleeping subjects respond to both external stimuli 
presented by an experimenter and naturally occurring internal stimuli, e.g., rapid eye 
movement (REM) sleep onset” (1988, 61). Here we see internal stimuli take on the form 
of the natural function of the human body. It is easy to think of times when one wakes 
from sleep because of the need to use the restroom or perhaps as a result of laying on 
your arm wrong and putting it to sleep. The human body reacts to these internal stimuli 
and will wake up even though no alarm clock went off. Experiencing a head-ache and 
taking ibuprofen would be another example of acting responsively due to internal 
stimuli. There is no need for an outside source explaining the issue, it is entirely 
dependent on the individual recognizing the internal indications. 
Responsiveness to internal stimuli can also be seen on a large scale through the nation 
state. The government of any state is responsive in several ways. First, they are 
responsive to internal stimuli from within the government itself. Second, they are 
responsive to stimuli from the populace of the nation. This responsiveness could be 




state’s government and the situation it is responding to. And third, the government is 
responsive to external stimuli from other extra-state actors such as other nation states 
or potentially multi-national corporations. Ultimately, what is seen through all of this 
discussion is a basic template for the concept of responsiveness. 
Returning to the dictionary, we now shift our attention to the concept of 
representation. The first definition of representation we are presented with reads, “The 
action of standing for, or in the place of, a person, group, or thing, and related senses” 
(OED 2010, representation). This overarching definition seems to distinguish the two 
concepts clearly from the start. Responsiveness relates to reaction to stimuli and 
representation does not. A sub-definition describes representation as, “Something 
which stands for or denotes another symbolically; an image, a symbol, a sign. Chiefly 
with of” (ibid.). for example, “Slepe is a certain ymage and representacion of death” 
(ibid.). here the symbolism in representation becomes apparent. In fact, the power 
behind this definition, or metaphor, seems to be stemming from the metaphors it 
creates. Erasmus gives weight to sleep by making it a symbol of death. We learn that 
through the symbolism behind representation, the image of the representative changes. 
Here sleep is not only the representative but also a symbol of death. This symbolism 
gives it a significantly different aspect than if sleep where metaphorically connected to 
peace, rest, exhaustion, or rejuvenation. Here we can see how responsiveness might 
become connected to representation. Metaphorical uses of representation make it easy 
to connect it to other concepts. In the Hobolt and Klemmensen article, we saw such a 




representation, elected representatives are expected to act responsively to the needs of 
their constituents” (Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008, 309). In essence what this statement 
says is that ”representation is responsiveness;” however, in the same way that sleep is 
not death, representation is not responsiveness. Here we see the scholars distracted by 
the lure of their own metaphor. It takes little to show that representation, especially in 
the context of government, is not responsiveness. This separation will be shown clearly 
as this thesis moves forward. 
Moving away from the purely symbolic, another definition describes representation as, 
“The fact or process of standing for, or in the place of, a person, group, institution, etc., 
esp. with the right or authority to speak or act on behalf of these; (in later use also) the 
action or fact of representing a party in a legal case” (ibid.). An example of this usage 
reads, “A High Commissioner… would be appointed to take over from the Viceroy duties 
connected with the representation of Britain in India” (ibid.). Clearly, representation 
moves beyond simply symbolism and takes on a practical role where an individual takes 
on the responsibility of expressing the will of either another individual or group of 
individuals. What is suggested by this usage is that representation is its own action. This 
characteristic is confirmed when the OED further defines representation as, “The action, 
fact, or right of being represented or representing others in a legislative or deliberative 
assembly; the principles or system associated with this” (ibid.). This function is further 
compounded when we see representation defined as, “The action of putting forward an 
account of something discursively; a spoken or written statement, esp. one which 




things from these definitions. First, representation is an action. Second, representation 
comes from an individual who acts in place of another. And third, representation can 
take the form of either speech or writing and has the potential to also be expressed 
non-lingually. For example, a gentleman representing the honor of a woman in a duel. 
This example is antiquated but none-the-less shows a way in which representation could 
be enacted outside of language.  
From this brief examination several characteristics of representation are illuminated. 
First, representation is symbolic even in the case of an individual representing a group, 
they become a symbol of that group. Second, representation is an action. Third, 
representation could be the role of an individual, a group of individuals, or an object. In 
each of these cases, the representative is representing another generally much larger 
group and takes on the role of being the face of the group. Fourth, representation can 
be either lingual or non-lingual. Fifth, representation often gives the representative 
power to make decisions for the group as a whole, this power is seen in governance. a 
representative is chosen, that individuals decisions reflect the decision-making power of 
the whole group behind them while not necessarily consulting each member. And sixth, 
the metaphoric nature of representation makes the larger groups perception of the 
representative unstable. 
Thinking back to the question posed in this chapter’s title, we see that representation 
and responsiveness are distinct from one another. While it is possible to connect them 
through metaphor as we saw Hobolt and Klemmensen do, in a practical sense, this 




responds to stimuli. Representation, on the other hand, is dealing with an individual or 
group of individuals taking on the task of expressing the perceived will of a group. It is 
true that in the task of representation, responsiveness might be a key characteristic of a 
representative; however, that is uncertain. Take for example a monarch. He is the 
symbolic head of his nation state and the representative of the people, but that does 
not mean that he needs to be responsive to the desires of the populace. Historically, 
monarchs, even when pursuing the good of their people, rarely listen to the people they 
represent. Ultimately, by approaching the question of meaning from the dictionary, we 
have reached an impasse. The two concepts have room to interact, and it even makes 
sense for them to. However, interchangeable usage of the terms is simply inexplicable. 
The definitions and usage of each concept are clearly separate, and while there is room 
for interaction, there is no overlap in practical usage. In ordinary language, the two 
concepts are clearly separated. Because of this separation in ordinary language, another 





Chapter 4 – Can Responsiveness be Isolated from Representation 
in Governance? 
 
I have shown that responsiveness and representation are treated as the same concept 
in some exemplary pieces of political science literature. In ordinary language, there is no 
explanation for this; and through an examination of the dictionary it has been made 
clear that the two concepts do not share overlapping meaning. Responsiveness may be 
a part of representation, yet it is not necessary for representation. In turn, 
representation is not necessary for responsiveness. But in the realm of governance, is it 
possible to study responsiveness without also engaging representation?  So far, this 
does not seem to be the case as each of the studies examined has been a study of a 
specifically democratic government. This chapter, however, will seek to isolate the two 
concepts by studying examples of responsiveness in an authoritarian context. In the 
context of democratic governance, we can expect to see responsiveness and 
representation both present. Representatives are supposed to be responsive to the 
demands of their constituents and generally that is what we see (Cleary 2007; Kuklinski 
and Stange 1979).  In contrast, authoritarian systems of government are understood to 
lack representation and as a result there is not the same expectation of governmental 
responsiveness . Chen, Pan, and Xu (2014), clearly lay out that the response to public 
pressure can be either redistribution of resources to meet the peoples’ demands or 
repression to silence the peoples’ protests (ibid., 6). Of course, this does raise the 




event that it does, then there is likely no example of authoritarian governance that does 
not act responsively. Still the question remains, can the concept of responsiveness be 
studied in isolation from representation? 
Before diving into the literature, three things should be noted: First, there are 
surprisingly few studies on responsiveness under authoritarian rule. Second, the work 
that does exist is relatively recent only going back roughly a decade. The implication 
from this is that until recently social scientists did not see responsiveness as being 
present at all under authoritarian rule. Third, the works which I examine have been 
selected as they are some of the most cited works in the literature around authoritarian 
responsiveness and are representative of the larger area of study. As before, I am only 
examining a few works as an in-depth understanding, of a few representative works, is 
more helpful for the purpose of this thesis than a larger number of surface level 
examinations. Depth of understanding rather than breadth is of utmost importance. 
Chen, Pan, and Xu’s 2014 article, “Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness: A Field 
Experiment in China,” is an excellent place to start the examination of authoritarian 
responsiveness. They do a thorough examination of county level governance in China in 
order to determine what the most likely causal factors leading to responsiveness are 
(ibid., 11). They state, “Our outcome of interest is responsiveness, and we measure 
responsiveness in four ways after the initial post was submitted” (ibid.). To collect data, 
the researchers put in requests for assistance to county governmental online portals in 
2,227 of the 2,821 total counties in China. These requests fell into four groups: a control 




responsiveness to threats of reporting to higher levels of government; and a group 
testing for responsiveness to claims of party membership and loyalty (ibid., 10, 17-18). 
Through statistical analysis of the responses to the portal requests, the study finds that 
the threat of collective action and the threat of reporting to higher levels of government 
have a significant impact on the responsiveness of government officials. Interestingly, 
claims of party membership and loyalty have only a minor impact. The percentage of 
responses which directly address the issue brought up were 5.9%, 4.3%, and 0.3% higher 
than the control group respectively. It should be pointed out that the large majority of 
requests in each category were not responded to at all. The percentage left unanswered 
were 76.9% for the control group, 69.2% for the “collective action threat” group, 70.0% 
for the “tattling threat” group, and 73.5% for the “claims of loyalty” group (ibid., 26). 
The remaining percentage falls into responses that either defer the request, usually 
claiming that there is insufficient information, or referrals to other departments. 
The actual treatment of the concept of responsiveness is relatively clean. However, they 
fail to define responsiveness while at the same time suggesting that what actually 
counts as responsiveness is in question. They explain that “broadly speaking, the regime 
can either repress or redistribute to prevent the masses from attempting to revolt” 
(Chen, Pan, Xu 2014, 6). In essence, they have stated that responsiveness could take the 
form of either repression or redistribution; however, they go on to dismiss this dual 
nature by explaining that “The aversion to social instability on part of the local agent… 
does not necessarily lead to responsiveness. It could as easily lead to repression” (ibid., 




challenging to recognize. By giving a clear working definition, this risk would have been 
avoided. The question of a definition is particularly important in the discussion of the 
theory that Chen, Pan, and Xu base their work on. As they discuss the possibility of the 
government either redirecting resources or repressing the people to resolve perceived 
threats to legitimacy, there is a lot of room to question whether both of those actually 
fall under responsiveness (ibid., 6).  Chen, Pan and Xu seem to view repression as falling 
outside of responsiveness; however, repression remains troubling as most of the work 
studying responsiveness is in the context of democracy where repression would 
generally not be part of the discussion and in turn is not viewed as a part of government 
responsiveness (ibid., 9). Still, repression seems to stand in juxtaposition to 
representation. As seen before, representation is deeply connected to responsiveness. 
Repression may fall into the same category, functioning as a deeply connected concept 
which may be inseparable from responsiveness. Citizen approved repression is certainly 
an active part of democratic governance. For example, citizens in the United States have 
agreed to let the government set restrictions on all forms of things, from speed limits to 
what substances an individual can legally consume. We have empowered the 
government to police the public in order to ensure that these restrictions are honored. I 
would contend that this action is a form repression, one which is under particular 
scrutiny currently with the Black Lives Matter and movements focused toward 
abolishing the police.  Additionally, repression and responsiveness are often connected 
in ordinary talk. To give just one example, Ronald Aminzade writes that, “the new 




rather than responsive tactics of repression…” (Aminzade 1981, 193). Aminzade is a 
sociologist at the University of Minnesota, the book which this example comes from is 
examining how the development of early capitalism transformed the political landscape 
in France during the mid-nineteenth century. This concept is important as it presents a 
clear example of political scientists rejecting the relationship between two concepts 
simply because acknowledging it would force a shift in how the concept of democracy is 
understood. This unwillingness to change how repression is understood as a concept 
points to a likely origin of confusion about responsiveness which as a concept is also 
deeply colored by the democratic context that the discipline operates in and studies. 
Chen, Pan, and Xu recognize the unwillingness of many scholars to adjust how a concept 
is understood within the study of responsiveness in authoritarian settings and address 
this issue in the last paragraph of their work (ibid., 29):  
In contrast to existing literature where citizen engagement and protest are the 
catalysts for regime change, our results suggest that in an authoritarian regime 
capable of building institutions complementary to citizen engagement, citizen 
engagement could contribute to regime survival, or at the very least, citizen 
engagement is not necessarily a harbinger of the collapse of institutionalized 
single-party regimes (ibid.). 
Here I take the phrase “building institutions complimentary to citizen engagement” as 
suggesting institutions which are both responsive to the citizenry and potentially 
representative in some form. While I am making an interpretive stretch, both the 




itself would suggest that it is an accurate assessment. This is a telling observation as it 
completely changes what responsiveness to citizen engagement might suggest. It is also 
important in understanding the connection between responsiveness and 
representation. If responsiveness can only be present where there is democratic 
representation, then China could not have responsiveness unless of course the regime is 
weakening and transitioning to democracy. On the other hand, China clearly does have 
a form of representation, and Chen, Pan, and Xu’s study points to it being responsive to 
public opinion (ibid., 3, 5, 6.). While the study does a good job of avoiding direct 
engagement with the concept of representation, only mentioning it briefly in the 
beginning, it is hard to tell whether this is a result of a perceived lack of representation 
or simply a desire to avoid the complexity of navigating an unfamiliar variant of the 
concept.  
Marquis and Bird’s 2018 work, “The Paradox of Responsive Authoritarianism,” 
examining the relationship between responsive authoritarianism and economic 
governance provides a revealing juxtaposition with Chen, Pan, and Xu’s work. The study 
is a statistical analysis of the enforcement of environmental regulations based on civil 
outcry (Marquis and Bird 2018, 957). By examining the restrictions and penalties placed 
on all corporations listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange that are within 
the manufacturing, mining, or power generation industries, Marquis and Bird are able to 
get a fairly large glimpse of how environmental regulation is being enforced. The 
authors are most interested in how the form of civil outcry, the capacity of the local 




and compliance with environmental regulation (ibid., 951-957). The results of the 
analysis show that there was a significant impact from both the form of civic activism 
and the size of bureaucracy. In locales with larger bureaucracies, civic engagement was 
met with strong environmental propaganda and businesses suffered from fewer 
restrictions and penalties as a result (ibid., 962). When the activism took the form of 
protests rather than comments to online portals, the local government was more likely 
to address the specific issues which were brought up (ibid., 960).  This was extenuated 
in locales where the media had more freedom to report on protests. Interestingly, the 
actual impact on overall regulation was found to be generally negative (ibid., 962). In 
districts with a greater bureaucratic presence and or a greater level of media freedom 
present, issues that were being dealt with would be used to distract the public from 
other more significant violations (ibid.). Marquis and Bird argue that what is seen in the 
balance of tolerance and repression is a government which has given up control and 
liberalized in order to maintain legitimacy (ibid., 964). Marquis and Bird’s study did 
suffer from several issues with data availability (ibid.). First, because of limited 
information on corporate compliance with environmental regulation, the measure for 
compliance was limited to only a rough measurement. Second, because letters are 
posted anonymously and content was often withheld, there is no way to tease out the 
level of grievance or determine the extent of overlap. Finally, to report on 
environmental protests, the researchers had to rely on what the media reported. Since 
censorship likely leads to underreporting, it is highly probable that the data collected 




is rather hard to determine, especially because of censorship, but given the available 
data the study is well executed. 
The conclusion of the study is somewhat disappointing. By pointing to the balance 
between tolerance and repression as a sign of increasing liberalization, the study sits in 
stark contrast to Chen, Pan, and Xu’s work which suggests that this balance instead 
points to a more resistant form of authoritarianism (Chen, Pan, Xu 2019, 29). While the 
Chinese government has allowed its citizens increased freedom, outside of a literal 
understanding of liberalization as increased liberty, it does not seem to actually be 
liberalization in a western democratic sense. We certainly are not seeing a change in 
values which point to a coming shift to democracy in these articles, because of this the 
claim seems rather farfetched. 
To refocus on the question posed in this chapter, I will now examine responsiveness as 
conceptualized in Marquis and Brid’s study. This study is essential for the goals of this 
thesis insofar as it reveals an aspect of responsiveness that is ignored or dismissed in the 
other studies so far examined here (Marquis and Bird 2018, 949, 965). This study 
describes two forms of responsiveness (ibid., 951). First, it describes responsiveness in 
the form of tolerance. This takes the form of legal routes for citizens to express concern 
about violations of environmental regulation. Second, it describes responsiveness in the 
form of repression. In this form, responsiveness takes the form of preventing 
environmental protest and restricting what letters of concern are shown and what is 




Thus, the paramount goal of maintaining performance legitimacy leads to a 
paradox of responsive authoritarianism: the government solicits public opinion 
and tolerates change efforts to improve governance, while at the same time, it 
also resists threats from that information to retain control and sustain 
authoritarianism (Marquis and Bird 2018, 951). 
Clearly, Marquis and Bird understand both tolerance and repression as a form of 
governmental responsiveness in this context. This interpretation is reinforced when the 
study deals with both tolerance and repression under the umbrella of responsiveness 
(ibid., 948 and 951). This understanding of the nature of responsiveness brings up some 
intriguing observations. In opposition to the Chen, Pan, and Xu article’s understanding 
of repression, here it is clear that repression is a key form of responsiveness. In order to 
maintain the appearance of legitimacy, extensive restrictions and censorship are 
employed to give the appearance of a highly effective bureaucracy (ibid., 950-951). 
Additionally, responsiveness in the form of tolerance is clearly connected with 
representation. The government allows increased expression of concern by citizens and 
then responds to those concerns by taking action and increasing regulation severity 
around the concerns that are most prominent (ibid.). This is clearly government 
representation of citizens’ policy preferences at a local level. The article’s inclusion of 
repression as a form of responsiveness is the most significant outcome for the study of 
responsiveness. Marquis and Bird’s article is the only one to directly suggest that 
repression is actually a form of responsiveness. This suggestion challenges the 




responsiveness is seen not only in authoritarian countries but also in the venerated 
western democratic world.  
Both articles bring useful observations into the discussion of responsiveness. Chen, Pan, 
and Xu’s article points out that increased tolerance does not necessarily mean that the 
country is liberalizing (Chen, Pan, Xu 2014, 29).  Marquis and Bird point to repression as 
a viable form of responsiveness (Marquis and Bird 2018, 950-951). Each of these will be 
useful moving forward but for now they will have to go on a back burner. What is of 
most significance is that neither article isolated responsiveness successfully from 
representation. The articles approach the concept very differently. While Chen, Pan, and 
Xu are focused on the concept of responsiveness and directly address it throughout 
their work, Marquis and Bird are mostly interested in the practical implications of 
responsiveness. In both treatments, representation was an important aspect of 
responsiveness. Unfortunately, while this does point to responsiveness and 
representation being mutually present, Marquis and Bird suggesting that repression is a 
form of responsiveness makes it challenging to determine an actual answer. 
Governments can be exclusively repressive and fail to represent the citizenry at all, in 
cases like these, responsiveness would be isolated from representation. The difficulty is 
determining whether such a regime exists. While further study of authoritarian 
governments might reveal that there are countries with responsive governments that 
have no representation present, it would be a study far beyond the scope of this thesis. 




isolate representation from responsiveness. This leads us to our last question: what is 




Chapter 5 – Why Distinguishing Responsiveness from 
Representation Matters Politically 
 
So far, this work has shown that exemplary pieces of literature within political science 
connect the concepts of responsiveness and representation. The concepts are clearly 
distinguished in ordinary language; however, they seem inseparable from each other in 
the context of governance. This inseparability makes it tempting to simply dismiss their 
connection altogether and point to it as insignificant. This chapter will tie together 
several issues that have been observed throughout this thesis and construct a larger 
argument about the significance of the connection between responsiveness and 
representation. 
Failure to define and separate the concepts of responsiveness and representation 
creates confusion for both readers and authors. This confusion can be seen in the 
differences between each of the authors understanding of responsiveness. Hobolt and 
Klemmensen define representation as acting responsively and use the two concepts 
interchangeably (2008, 309). They fail to satisfactorily address the concept of 
responsiveness at all. Ultimately, they see responsiveness as a prominent characteristic 
of representation that stems from elections (ibid.). Kuklinski and Stanga take the time to 
define responsiveness; however, their definition sits in an uneasy relationship with the 
works they cite as the source of the explanation (Kuklinski and Stanga 1979, 1090-1091). 
While the understanding of the nature and origin of responsiveness is different, the 




remains. The rather nebulous definition they provide not only leaves the reader 
uncertain but points to Kuklinski and Stanga understanding the concepts as being 
synonyms.  For both sets of authors, difficulty in situating their work within the 
literature and uncertainty as to what they are actually examining arises as a result of 
failure to separate the two concepts. This problem in turn resulted from a failure to 
define responsiveness adequately before pressing on and examining it. Additionally, 
Kuklinski and Stanga seem to have neglected to read their own sources. If they had 
more seriously attempted to define their concepts their attentiveness to the sources 
would never have come into question. The reason that this was not attempted is that 
representation has become so deeply connected with responsiveness that it is hard to 
find one without the other in existing work on governance. 
Marquis and Bird point out that responsiveness can take the form of either 
representation or repression (Marquis and Bird 2018, 951). In making this observation, 
they show the necessity of separating and defining the concepts. Chen, Pan, and Xu take 
similar evidence and conclude that repression is not a form of responsiveness (Chen, 
Pan, and Xu 2014, 9). If the time is not taken to present some form of definition for your 
concepts, it is extremely challenging to determine what causes these disagreements 
between authors. Marquis and Bird could have stated at the beginning how they 
understood responsiveness and in so doing it would become much simpler for the 
reader to understand both their arguments and to compare them with another set of 
scholars. Unfortunately, providing definitions early on is not common practice within 




Stanga 1979, 1091), who have their own issues, none of the authors examined in this 
thesis define the concept of responsiveness.  Additionally, neither Kuklinski and Stanga 
nor Hobolt and Klemmensen adequately distinguish between responsiveness and 
representation. 
The reason for the importance of providing working definitions goes beyond preventing 
confusion. When definitions are not provided, it becomes more challenging to 
determine what about the world the authors’ understanding of a concept forces them 
to miss. Recall Pitkin’s observation, “If you use distinct terms interchangeably or ignore 
fine differences, then as Cavell puts it, there is likely to be ‘something you aren’t 
noticing about the world’” (Pitkin 1972, 277). In this case, what seems to be widely 
missed is the potential for responsiveness to not only function through representation 
but, as Marquis and Bird observe, also through repression (Marquis and Bird 2018, 951). 
It is curious that something so significant could be so easily missed. To understand how 
such an important observation could be missed for so long or ignored even when it is 
visible in the research results, it will be necessary to step away from the question of 
definition and look at the ideological commitments of the researchers themselves. 
Ideological commitments are important primarily because no researcher does work 
outside of them. All research is colored by the views of the researcher, I contend that 
this influence is especially present within our discipline of political science. Whether a 
researcher is primarily interested in quantitative research or qualitative research will 
dramatically impact the work they do. The difference between being a realist, 




research. Even the university a researcher attended can affect the work they do. The 
influence of the individual extends beyond academic training. The religion one holds to, 
the political beliefs, and the culture a researcher grew up in will all influence the way 
that they will see and understand the world. The impact of these influences can be seen 
in the discussion of responsiveness. How scholars within the discipline understand the 
concept of responsiveness cannot but be shaped by the discipline’s deeply pro-
democracy roots. The concept of responsiveness is treated largely as a democratic trait 
of governance and is a purely positive trait. This reality can be seen in the treatment of 
responsiveness by authors like Matthew Cleary who view responsiveness outside of a 
democratic context as inexplicable given our current understanding (Cleary 2019, 297) 
or authors like Marquis and Bird who see it as a sign of democratization (Marquis and 
Bird 2018, 964).  
At the same time, more recent scholars who are willing to accept responsiveness 
outside of a democratic context, find it extremely challenging to redefine what 
responsiveness is along with an expanded understanding of where it can be found. This 
difficulty is perhaps most evident in Chen, Pan, and Xu’s article as they reject repression 
as a form of responsiveness even though all of the evidence seems to point the other 
way (Chen, Pan, and Xu 2014, 9). Additionally, rather than being treated in terms of the 
regime it is found in, responsiveness is widely taken as sign of liberalization and regime 
change. Chen, Pan, and Xu demonstrate well that in the context of China, it seems to 
simply be part of a more stable form of authoritarianism rather than a shift away from 




responsiveness that is influenced more by the context the research is produced in, than 
by the research itself. 
A further issue I see stemming from the unacknowledged ideological commitment of 
scholars is a teleological understanding of governance. It is most visible through the 
Marquis and Bird article. As they study the presence of responsiveness in China and its 
effect on economic regulation, they come to the conclusion that responsiveness is 
acting as a liberalizing force and a step on the road to democracy (Marquis and Bird 
2018, 264). What points to a teleological view is that there is no question of whether 
something else is happening but instead the bold statement, and one well outside the 
scope of their research, that we are seeing the “authoritarian regimes’ struggle to 
balance liberalization with control” (ibid.). The assumption is simply that democracy will 
be the end result. The work of authors such as Kuklinski and Stanga reinforces this 
perspective even more as it assumes the necessity of democracy for responsiveness 
through communication to develop. The liberalization which would allow 
communication eventually will lead to democracy. From this perspective, there is some 
room to see responsiveness outside of a teleological lens. Authors like Hobolt and 
Klemmensen suffer from the most issues. In claiming that responsiveness is the result of 
competitive elections (Hobolt and Klemmensen 2007, 332), they lose the ability to 
explain its presence in a non-democracy other than to say that liberalization is taking 
place and we are seeing a shift in governance away from authoritarianism. From each of 
these perspectives, there is a strong suggestion of a teleologic understanding of 




the only authors to suggest a non-teleologic view were Chen, Pan, and Xu; however, 
they had their own issue in that they rejected repression as a form of responsiveness 
even though their evidence should have suggested its inclusion. Ultimately, the trend 
that is seen suggests a tendency toward teleologic arguments, both implicit and explicit, 
when dealing with the concept of responsiveness. 
This outcome begs the question, is responsiveness unique in generating a teleological 
argument or do other concepts create the same tendencies? While any rigorous answer 
is beyond the scope of this work, I will present an argument based on the observations 
made so far. First, scholars do not thoroughly understand the concepts they are working 
with. This lack of understanding is then compounded by their basic ideological 
commitments influencing how they are willing to understand a concept. As a result, they 
are either unwilling or unable to recognize when conceptual understanding fails to fit 
the world they are studying. Because of this inability, rather than reshaping the concept 
around the evidence presented, they interpret the evidence based on the existing 
concept. At this point, unintended teleological arguments form which are necessary for 
the concept to remain static. The argument becomes ‘for this concept to be present 
here, we must be seeing some emerging shift that fits our pre-existing understanding of 
the concept.’ The end result is a teleology which is remarkably resilient and hard to 
locate. 
In this work, I point to the concept of responsiveness as an example of this process. I 
contend that the framework for its creation is far more widespread. While examining 




both representation and repression as protentional examples of teleologies being 
created. Where there is representation, democracy must be present. Where there is 
repression, authoritarianism must be present. Admittedly, this treatment is an 
extremely rough overview of these concepts and how they are treated, but the goal is to 
suggest a starting location rather than a worked-out example. Regardless, there is still 
one final question which needs to be answered. How can scholars push back against the 





Chapter 6 – Conclusion: How Can We Avoid Concept – fitted 
Teleologies? 
 
In the previous chapters, this thesis has asked and answered four primary questions. 
Chapter two asked, does the literature within political science treat responsiveness as 
its own concept? By examining exemplary articles that deal with the concept of 
responsiveness, it was shown that responsiveness is often confused or used 
interchangeably with representation. This observation led to chapter three’s question, 
How are responsiveness and representation distinguished in ordinary language? By 
examining how the concepts are dealt with in the dictionary, this thesis was able to 
determine that although there is room for interplay between the concepts, there is no 
crossover in meaning. The two concepts are completely distinct in ordinary language. 
This somewhat concerning outcome brought the next question which is found in 
chapter four. Can responsiveness be Isolated from representation in governance? 
Because there was little reason for the concepts’ interchangeable usage, this work 
attempted to identify an example of responsiveness without the presence of 
representation. Ultimately, this effort proved unsuccessful as even in authoritarian 
governments, where responsiveness was seen there was generally representation 
present with it. In the process, what was determined is that responsiveness did not 





At the same time that repression was acknowledged as a legitimate form of 
responsiveness, it became clear that the concept of responsiveness was connected not 
only to representation but more importantly directly to democracy. Responsiveness was 
either a signal of democratic governance or of a shift toward democracy within a non-
democratic government. What was of most significance in the moment however was 
the fact that responsiveness and representation really were not separable. All of this 
information combined to bring the final question. Chapter five asks, what does the 
relationship between responsiveness and representation reveal? The chapter goes on to 
point out several issues that are revealed through an examination of conceptual linkage. 
First, because of inadequate working definitions, scholars are not understanding the 
concepts they are working with. Second, linking concepts makes it difficult to see other 
concepts which one or another of the linked concepts may interact with individually. 
Third, although responsiveness is present in democracy, it is also present in other forms 
of governance. This presence is easily missed however, because it has been so deeply 
connected to representation and democracy. Fourth and finally, deep and unquestioned 
connections between concepts can and does lead to teleological arguments in order to 
justify what is being seen. We have seen the argument that because there is 
responsiveness in China, and responsiveness is democratic, then China must be 
transitioning to democracy. Democracy becomes an inevitable next stage. These issues 
are connected into a causal chain that shows how the process which led to a teleological 
argument developing out of an uncompromising understanding of responsiveness, can 




This work will answer one final question and then conclude. This chapter asks: how can 
we avoid concept-fitted teleologies? First, we need to give more attention to how 
concepts are being defined and why they are being defined the way they are. Second, 
we need to give concepts which are attached to specific forms of governance special 
attention. Simply accepting that a concept can only manifest in specific governmental 
circumstances sets researchers up to miss when that concept manifests elsewhere. 
Third and finally, the ideological commitments of those in the discipline need to be 
acknowledged and questioned. Some scholars within the discipline have already begun 
thinking about the impact of the researchers own commitments on the study and use 
the term positionality to refer to the entirety of a researcher’s context and 
commitments.  
The goal of recognizing one’s positionality is to encourage scholars to acknowledge how 
their own commitments and position in networks of power impact the research they are 
conducting. While it may be impossible to acknowledge every personal commitment or 
power relationship contributing to positionality, even attempting to recognize these 
commitments radically changes how one must conduct research. Take for example 
Timothy Pachirat’s essay, “The Political in Political Ethnography: Dispatches from the 
Killing Floor” (Schatz 2009, 143-161) In it we see Pachirat grapple with the reality of 
shifting positionality and the impact on both how his study was conducted and also 
what was revealed in it (ibid., 147). As he moved from one position in the slaughter 
house to another and then finally left it and conducted outside research, his perspective 




had attempted to maintain a single position of power for the entirety of the study (ibid., 
156-157). Ultimately, he demonstrates how powerful a tool one’s own position can be in 
the hands a self-aware researcher. Positionality is not limited to one’s physical location 
or position. It can be deeply connected to how one chooses to engage with a study. My 
own positionality in this work is of significance. I made the decision to examine 
responsiveness outside of democracy and instead look to an ostensibly dissimilar 
context. The goal was to see what is revealed by asking normal questions in an unusual 
context. The result is a revelation that responsiveness is supported through a 
teleological argument. This example is important not because I achieved an examination 
of my own positionality perfectly but rather because it demonstrates that positionality 
has significance for conceptual studies and is not limited to the examination of physical 
or visible phenomena. 
To conclude, this thesis contributes to the discipline by challenging the conventional 
treatment of concepts in research. It shows that there is a need for more thorough work 
on responsiveness and suggests that the issues seen with this concept likely spread to 
many other widely used concepts. The largest contribution is in pointing out a way that 
teleological arguments are created which then spread out and percolate widely within 
the discipline. Similar research on other concepts which have either been connected 
with each other or been deeply connected to specific forms of governance would be 
needed to see how far this issue extends. Additionally, research looking for the presence 
of concepts manifesting in places we would not usually expect them may further our 
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